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Abstract
A novel technique for identifying irregular event log entries is presented in this paper along with the imple-
mentation in a Microsoft Windows-based environment. The motivation behind this research is to identify
irregular activity in a system whilst minimising any requirement on expert knowledge, in addition to sav-
ing investigative time and computing resources. As the developed solution utilises the standard Microsoft
format for event logs, it can work with both live systems, as well as events extracted and stored for off-site
analysis. The solution consists of two major steps: first, convert the event logs into objects-based model
and second, perform statistical analysis using the Chi-squared (χ2) test of independence and classify mean
χ2 values into discrete categories using Jenks natural breaks method. The event logs entries, which failed
the test of dependence are considered as irregular events. It is also shown that the proposed solution poses
an advantage over primitive frequency analysis methods as it uses object relationships among event log
entries to determine irregularities for locating anomalous activities. Empirical analysis of the solution is
performed using event logs data from 20 machines and shows promising results by correctly identifying
irregular events. Further experimental analysis involving the insertion of synthetic irregular events results
in an average accuracy of 85%.
Keywords: Chi-square (χ2), Test of independence, Jenks natural break, Frequency analysis, Irregular
events, Automated expert analysis
1. Introduction
An event log contains a sequence of discrete events that are automatically constructed by a computer’s
operating system, running software services, and user created applications. In general, event logs have
information related to security, performance and error events. An event log stores data for retrieval at a
later date by a security professional or use by an automated security system. Some applications and services
have their own bespoke mechanism of logging, form example through the use of bespoke data formats stored
in Comma Separated Value (CSV) or eXtensible Markup Language (XML) format. It is also common that
the operating system itself provides a centralised mechanism for storing and reporting event logs. This
centralised mechanism makes it easier for a user to examine and search for relevant content. In this paper
we focus on processing the Microsoft event logging mechanism, although the develop techniques are general
and can be applied elsewhere to different logging mechanisms.
An event log stores information that can be essential in performing system diagnostics and security
audits. By default, the system will log event information which is believed to be of relevance, although in
the Microsoft system event logging can be enabled for many additional security configuration events that may
be of further benefit during an auditing procedure. For example, enabling event logging for changing of file
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system permissions and assigning users to groups. Another useful feature of the logging mechanism is that
the occurrence of an event is recorded in terms of objects (name-value pairs). These objects correspond to
timed entities and provide comprehensive details of the event, such as username, permissions and timestamp,
which is useful for analysis.
Many experienced administrative and security practitioners are aware of what information is available in
the event log and will have knowledge and expertise of how to search for information of interest. However,
this process can be troublesome during time-critical processing. Performing a manual audit of the event log
to identify or reject investigative hypothesise is time-consuming, even with experience and expert knowledge.
Another challenge exists for users with less experience and expertise as access to expertise becomes expensive
through the use of consultancy services and automation software. In some instance the event log might store
information critical to the security and usability of an individual’s computer, but without in-depth knowledge
and expertise the user is unable to identify and interpret this information [1].
The aforementioned challenges motivates further research into the identification and extraction of useful
information held within the event log. There are techniques available in the public domain that perform
an automated search of an event log and identify events of interest by comparing them against a known
knowledge-base. Although such approaches are only useful for identifying events that are known to be of
interest, they are not capable of identifying events that are potentially of significance in terms of security and
usability due to their low frequency of occurrence, as well as their irregular involvement with the operating
system’s underlying objects. Here the set of underlying objects could include a user and a collection of
directories. An irregularity in terms of event log entries could be that a user has been granted a higher than
normal level of access permissions on a directory, which is reported within the event log. The automated
identification of such irregular events would allow the user to determine suspicious activities in a resourceful
and efficient manner.
The aim of this paper is to introduce a technique for automatically identifying irregular event log entries.
This paper builds on previous work where researchers have developed an unsupervised technique to identify
irregular file system permissions using statistical analysis [2]. This requires modelling the event log in a way
that allows us to use a statistical test of independence between an event’s objects and their distribution
among all events. The research hypothesis addressed in this paper is: using statistical methods on event
logs can assist in identifying event log entries of interest without programatically encoding knowledge. The
primary contributions presented in this paper are:
• A novel technique for identifying irregular event log entries. This automated technique takes
an object-centred modelling perspective to event log entries. Following this, a statistical analysis (χ2)
technique is used to identify event log entries which fail a test of dependence. Empirical analysis is
then provided to evaluate the effect of event log complexity, and the frequency distribution of event
log objects.
• A novel software tool for interacting with Microsoft’s event log mechanism. The produced
software tool enables users with limited experience and expertise of the Microsoft event logging mech-
anism to quickly identify irregular, and potentially interesting, event log entries. Furthermore, the
software tool has the ability to provide an automated solution to find interesting events, and therefore
reducing investigation time required by an expert.
• Empirical analysis and case study. The significance of the proposed techniques and tool is then
evaluated through the use of 20 real event logs to determine overall performance and usefulness. This
analysis is then supplemented by inserting synthetic irregular security event, and the technique results
in an 85% average accuracy.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 contains a survey of related work and
discusses state-of-the-art in event log auditing. Section 3 presents the modelling of an event log into a
suitable form for further processing. Section 4 presents a simplistic frequency analysis to find event log types
which appear both frequently and infrequently. This then leads on to Section 5 where the development of
a object-based model that is subsequently used alongside a statistical test of independence and is used to
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determine irregular event log entries. Examples and empirical analysis regarding performance and accuracy
are also presented. Section 7.2 presents a large-scale evaluation both on synthetic and real event log systems
to establish the performance and accuracy of the proposed technique.
2. Related Work
An event log is a record of any significant or erroneous activity by a user or program. It usually contains
a complete set of information (such as date, time, user account, machine, description, type, etc.) that can
help in understanding that specific occurrence in the system [3]. Event logs can be generated by users,
applications and the system itself. As the event logs can often be produced in high frequency (dependent on
configuration), and their total number expands over time, the major concern is their proper management as
well as in extracting useful and actionable information. Many studies have been undertaken to address these
challenges. In one study, the concepts of event patterns, event filtering, event aggregation and causal event
histories are presented to provide an overview of Complex Event Processing [4] in a distributed system.
The event patterns are the rules, which are used in event filtering mechanism to gather relevant or
required events logs. Their relation can be described in terms of time, dependency or mutual exclusion.
The related event logs are used as an input of event aggregation system, which outputs a map of newly
generated (abstract) higher level events and their causal relationships. The causal event histories defines the
relationship(s) of one event to another with respect to the activity’s semantics. In another study [5], event
logs are analysed using the α algorithm. The technique was successfully able to rediscover workflow process
models of two real-time applications (health-care and judicial system) without any knowledge, alongside the
presence of unrelated events (noise). The extracted information is then converted in the form of SWF-net
(part of the Flash language) to make it visually more useful for the end user. A similar study [6] focuses on
the generation of event logs through social networks. They extend process mining, filtering and clustering
techniques to retrieve information from the event logs, build an ordered sets using time as a metric, and
then present the results in the form of Petri-nets.
As previously mentioned, event logs contain a large amounts of text data, which make analysing them
a computationally challenging task. Primitive techniques do exist for debugging, searching, visualisation
and characterisation of event logs, such as sequential text clustering and Principle Atom Recognition In Sets
(PARIS) algorithms [7]. The approaches provide mechanisms to help perform structured analysis of an
event log’s contents. These mechanisms are effective; however, a large amount of investigative effort is still
required to identify irregular events of interest.
The availabilities of large amounts of event logs can be turned into an advantage if pattern analysis
is performed. One such approach is called frequent patterns mining [8], which can detect regularities and
anomalies in the data. In general, these algorithms take an entire set of event logs and slices them into a
time frame (e.g. 1 second). A specific combination of event logs is considered to be a frequent pattern if
it is present in a number of time frames. A study [9] provides an efficient breath-first algorithm for mining
frequent patterns in event logs. The authors claims that as the memory consumption of counting items in
each slice is high, the algorithm only counts those items that do not observe the pattern. I.e filtering out
those known to not be relevant. To further improve the performance, the algorithm considers a specific set
of event data properties; number of all items and transactions, items that occur less than 10 times, and
items that occur at least once per 1000 transactions.
In other studies aimed at developing techniques to further improve accuracy and performance, techniques
such as (frequent pattern) FP-growth algorithm [10] and its variants such as Parallel FP-Growth [11] and
Balanced Parallel FP-Growth [12] are proposed. The FP-Growth algorithm is claimed as one of the fastest
algorithm to determine associations, correlations, and causal structures among the sets of items. There are
also many other algorithms that improve upon various problems related to size, scalability and efficiency.
Some of them are FreeSpan [13], graph-based approach called gspan [14] and tree-based approaches known
as frequent pattern tree (FP-tree) [15], CanTree [16] and CP-tree [16]. The aim of these approaches is to
combine the itemsets for identifying strong and frequent co-occurrences but they perform the task in a
different structural forms, such as subgraphs, subtrees, or sublattices. In addition to finding correlations,
frequent patterns help in numerous research frontiers like data indexing, classification and clustering. These
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graph-based approaches which are used to identify strong relationships (strongly connected subgraphs) can
also be used to identify irregular and poorly connected sub graphs through inverting the evaluation function.
I.e., identifying those below a threshold rather than above.
Machine learning techniques have also be applied to analyse event logs. A tool called, Decision Miner [17]
uses decision trees to produce possible decision paths within a Petri net model to identify the dependencies.
The petri-net model is generated from event logs. The candidate paths are used as an input for already
trained J48 decision tree classifier and C4.5 algorithm, which outputs the final optimal decision. Another tool
named Little Thumb [18] is capable of capturing the concurrent event logs using a heuristic process mining
technique (by providing dependency/frequency table) and workflow petri-nets. Event log analysis can also
be performed for finding anomalies in the system. A similar study [19] has extracted identifiers and state
variables via console logging of over 24 million messages and used Principal Component Analysis (PCA)-
based unsupervised learning algorithm for anomaly detection. A similar system called Magpie [20] extracts
event logs traces across multiple systems of an e-commerce site and uses clustering algorithms to build a
probabilistic model of user’s request behaviour to detect anomalies. The machine learning algorithms can
further be improved through utilising different supervised learning mechanisms, for example the stochastic
gradient descent. It is shown [17] that the performance of Perceptron, Adaline, k-Means, Support Vector
Machines and Lasso algorithms have significantly been boosted using stochastic gradient descent.
Forensic analysis can also be used to extract, collect, correlate and interpret the complex and high
volume of event logging data, with a view to acquire investigative evidence. Current forensic techniques
have become more automated and accurate in nature and provides better efficiency and performance [21].
For this purpose, a model checking approach have been proposed to perform the forensic analysis based
on modal, temporal, linear and dynamic characteristics of the event logs [22]. The proposed algorithm
formalises the information inside each event log into algebraic mathematical symbols and then a constructs
a tree to convey all dependency relations. Another study presents a Principles-driven [23] forensic analysis
technique, which emphasises on determining the cause and effect (context) of actions based on the event
logging data. Authors claims that time is of key importance to improve the analysis process along with
a multi-resolution view of the data, which considers multiple metrics (users-space, system/kernel-space,
environment etc.) at any given instant. A patented piece work [24] provides a method to collectively
analyse the heterogeneous event logs from multiple devices. First, security event logs are remotely gathered
and normalized into a common schema. The authors cross-correlated the logs on the basis of pre-defined
rules for producing meta-events, which are then reported via e-mail or telephone messages.
This section has demonstrated that a wealth of research has been performed into processing event logs to
mine useful information, both in a security auditing and forensic context. However, many of the techniques
utilise and process limited aspects of an event’s details, particular those with a systematic and predicable
structure. More specifically, type and time are the most commonly used aspects. In this work, we investigate
processing an event’s description to extract an object-centric model which can further enhance event log
analysis, with a particular focus on identifying irregular events of interest.
3. Modelling
The structure of event logs changes depending on the underlying system and event cause. In this work,
we consider the Microsoft event logging system, whereby event log entries are created by system services,
as well as any software executing on the host system. The structure of an event entry is fixed; however, the
structure and contents of the description depends upon what information the system programmer decided
to include in the event. Some systems contain human readable content, whereas other contain information
useful for debugging experts and requires expert knowledge to interpret. It is therefore necessary to have a
generic mechanism to process content of the event logs. In this research, a generic approach is taken where
the event description is assembled to contain a set of objects.
An event log, E, consists of a series of events (E = {e1,e2, . . . ,en}) where each individual event is a
tuple, e = {T,I,O}, consisting of a timestamp (T ), an event ID (I), and a set of objects denoting the event
description O = {o1,o2, . . . ,on}. In the Microsoft environment, an event’s description will often contain
information dictated by the programmer and the event type. For example, error log entries for applications
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Permissions on an object were changed.
ID: log ID 4670
Subject:
Security ID: admin
Account Name: Bob
Account Domain: AD
Logon ID: 0x9B3EC
Object:
Object Server: Security
Object Name: D:
Handle ID: 0x5bc
Process:
Process ID: 0x1820
Permissions Change:
Original Security Descriptor:
D:(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)(A;OICI;FA;;;BA)
New Security Descriptor:
D:ARAI(A;OICIID;FA;;;SY)(A;OICIID;FA;;;BA)
(A;OICIID;FW;;;bob)
Figure 1: Example event showing the change in security permissions (ID 4670)
and services often contain specific debug messages that may help an expert understand what went wrong.
There is no requirement to adhere to a certain standard and the information can be as brief or descriptive as
the programmer decided. Fortunately, however, when creating event log entries related to security events,
Microsoft have adopted and consistently adhered to an object-centric logging standard. This is where all
objects related to the log entry (user, process, etc.) are clearly stated, which provide sufficient detail for the
security analyst to understand the occurrence of this event. For example, if someone made ten failed login
attempts into a server, the security event logs will contain ten events logs with I = 4625. Each entry will
have the information about the account name, failure reason, date/time, source network address, port etc.
Together with this data, an expert can determine if there was a security breach incident along with its kind
and what security measures should be taken to avoid this in future.
Figure 1 provides an example event description for assigning new file system permissions. As the text
details, the log ID is 4670, and the series of objects are listed below. This includes those related to the
“Subject”, “Object”, “Process” and those related to the “Permissions Change”. An example object is
“Account Name” and the object value is “Bob”.
4. Frequency Analysis
Performing a primitive frequency analysis of the event logs makes it possible to easily identify event types
that are occurring both frequently and infrequently. However, although such primitive analysis is beneficial,
the standard built-in event viewer does not provide such information.
The technique presented in this paper processes a series of events and counts the frequency occurrence
of each type, denoted by their ID. The technique iterates over all available events and constructs a series
of all unique event IDs and the frequency of their occurrence. More specifically, C = {c1,c2, . . . ,cn} where
c = {u,f} represents a unique event ID, u, and the frequency of occurrence, f . c is ordered in ascending
order based on frequency such that f1 ≤ f2 from c1 and c2, respectively.
This allows us to identify events that are infrequent and manually determine if they are irregular or
not. However, difficulty arises when deciding the cut-off threshold for frequencies that should be treated
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as potentially problematic. Expert analysis would help separate the irregular from regular events, but in
some cases such expert knowledge is not available. Therefore, in this paper a technique is presented which
attempts to firstly classify frequency scores which are most likely to be anomalous or irregular. To perform
this classification, Jenks natural breaks classification method [25] is used to determine the best arrangement
of values into different classes. This is performed by minimising each class’s standard deviation, whilst
maximising the standard deviation between classes. The class with the minimum standard deviation (i.e
lower frequency f scores) is the class of events which have the lowest frequency of occurrence and are
therefore to be treated as potentially irregular. To perform this the following classification function is used:
I(x) : {1 . . . n} 7→ {1 . . . k} (1)
where n is the number of data samples, and k is the number of classes where k ≤ n. Sj are the set
of indices that map to class j. The minimal sum of the sums of standard deviations (SDDn,k) is then
calculated by:
SDDn,k = min
I
k∑
j=1
ssd(Sj) (2)
The minimisation function is to select a classification (using I) such that the optimal number of classes
are chosen resulting in a the minimal SDDn,k, and thus the data is determined to be a ’natural fit’. The
ssd(Sj) is the sum of the squared deviations of the values of any index set S calculated using the following
equation where A is an ordered set of f scores.
ssd(S) =
∑
i∈S
[
A[i]−
(∑
i∈S A[i]
|S|
)]2
(3)
The minimisation function in Equation 2 is iteratively performed, with judgement being made as to
whether introduce a new set of indices. The general rule here is to continue iterating and expanding the
number of classes (and index positions) until the current SDDn,k is no longer a lower value that the previous
SDDn,k value.
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Figure 2: Number of event entries per class number
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Figure 3: Number of event types per class
An illustrative example is now discussed whereby an event log is acquired containing 157,609 events in
total. Performing frequency analysis on the event log determines that there are 181 unique event types
that have been identified. Jenks analysis is then iteratively performed until convergence is reached where
the minimum ssd(S) value has been identified through increasing the number of classes (j). The technique
converges at classifying the data into 63 classes. Figure 2 illustrates the number of total event entries within
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each class, and Figure 3 illustrates the number of different event types within each class. The results are
interesting as the number of event entries within the first class is low (at 1 per event type) and that the
first class is made up of many different event types, whereas class 63 only contains one type of event. In the
example provided, an example event from class one is 5973 which is reporting an issue with the Windows
Store application, whereas the last class is made up of event type 4663 which denotes access to a file system
resources.
This frequency analysis then requires interpretation by an expert to determine which class or classes
contains events of interest. For example, classes containing a high frequency would be inspected to determine
if there was some significant underlying problem causing the repeated logging of an event. Similarly, classes
with a low frequency will be examined to identify any potential infrequent log entries which could denote
suspicious information, and possibly even a security threat.
Although performing frequency analysis is useful for identifying event volumes, the provided example
demonstrates how it alone is not sufficient to identify events that are reporting on irregular activity. More-
over, there is a chance that an infrequent event is reporting on irregular activity; however, it is also possible
that a frequently occurring event is reporting on an irregular event. For this reason, the paper now focusses
on identifying events that are irregular in terms of the objects they contain and their relationships with
other events.
5. Test of Independence
The previous section has demonstrated a technique capable of classing event log entries based upon their
frequency of occurrence, enabling the ability to provide enriched information to the user. However, there is
a strong necessity to manually examine entries to verify those that are irregular and or anomalous. In this
section, a technique is presented, which resolves this issue by autonomously identifying irregularities in the
given event logs.
This section describes how irregularities in event log entries can be measured as the independence of
a event’s object, o, from an event type’s, t, distribution of entries. This object-centred approach is taken
due to interest in objects that are irregular for an event type. Furthermore, the occurrence of irregular
objects provides a greater granularity of analysis. When programatically examining the event logs, each
entry contains a series of string messages where key object-based information is present1.
Using statistical analysis to determine irregular event entries creates the potential to categorise irregular,
but correctly, event log entries. This is because in large multi-user systems there are many event logging
mechanisms which may only generate few amount of event logs. However, identifying these less frequent
events as irregular is still useful as it is important that they are monitored and reacted upon where necessary.
5.1. χ2 Analysis
χ2 statistics are used to measure the lack of independence between o and tj - which can then be compared
to the χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom (as there are two groups) to judge extremeness [26]. The χ2
statistic is chosen as it is a well established technique for measuring independence. For example, it has been
successfully used in text categorisation [27, 28], credit risk assessments [29], several medical studies regarding
Ebola patients [30] and Dementia [31] etc. Other techniques are also available for measuring independence,
such as Paired t-test [32] and Pearson correlation [33]. However, χ2 is not only computationally easy to
compute, it is also a non-parametric test which makes no assumption regarding the distribution of the
population [34]. This makes it a suitable candidate for the novel work presented in this paper. Using a
two-way contingency table for object o and event type tj where: A is the number of times o and tj co-occur,
B is the number of times o occurs without tj , C is the number of times tj occurs without o, D is the number
of times neither tj or o occur, N is the total number of objects to examine.
1The EventLogEntry class within the Microsoft .NET framework contains a series of ReplacementStrings, which provide
event details
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Log Event ID Number of
objects
χ2avg(e) Jenks class
153 6 1698 0
1073742727 2 2271 1
42 7 2512 2
32 4 2517 2
521 6 2725 3
25 4 3628 4
18 4 3628 4
37 9 4523 5
1073873154 2 4774 6
1073873155 2 4774 6
1073873153 2 4774 6
1073741861 3 5976 7
1073741856 3 5976 7
400 21 7248 8
403 21 7248 8
1026 50 7275 8
50037 4 8021 9
600 21 8488 10
Table 1: Example output from performing χ2 analysis a the Security event log of a personal computer, running Windows 10
From this a lack of independence measure between an object o and event tj by:
χ2(o, tj) =
N(AD − CB)2
(A+B)(A+ C)(B +D)(C +D)
(4)
The χ2 statistic has a natural value of zero if o and tj are independent. Therefore, it can be assumed
that any object o that occurs in event type tj with a χ
2 value close to zero is either an anomaly or an
irregular event entry. Following the calculation of χ2 scores, it is then useful to compute the mean χ2 for
each object using the following equation where l is the number of objects specified for an event, e:
χ2avg(e) =
1
l
l∑
j=1
χ2(o, tj) (5)
Similar to the desire to class frequency information in Section 4, there is a need to classify χ2avg(e) scores
to help identify those that are irregular. Jenks natural breaks classification method is used once again to
separate the one-dimension data in to classes. This enables information to be presented to the user in a way
where minimal effort and time is needed to find potentially irregular event log entries.
The same event log as used for frequency analysis in Section 4 is now used to test the modelled and
developed χ2 technique. The event log contains 157,609 and Table 1 provides an extract of the first 10
classes. Following this, the same Jenks analysis classification method is used to classify χ2avg(e) scores to
identify the class with the lowest score and are most likely to be irregular. In the example presented in
Table 1, the results are grouped in to 97 classes.
From Table 1 it is evident that those event IDs having the lowest χ2avg(e) scores are classified in the
lower groups in the Jenks analysis. The event containing an ID of 153 informs that an IO operation issue
has been detected during a writing operation, and potentially indicates a deteriorating hard drive health.
The event with an ID of 1073742727 informs that a software protection service has stopped. Events within
class number 10 (ID of 600) indicate that a service or a scheduled task has started under the authority
of a different user. Clearly these events warrant further investigation by the administration and it would
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Read Event Log
Extract Objects
Calculate χ2 Scores
Iterative Jenks Analysis
Set of Irregular Events
Figure 4: Process overview
appear that this mechanism has correctly identified events that warrant further investigation, without the
administrator needing to perform an exhaustive manual search.
6. Implementation
The analysis technique has been implemented in Microsoft’s C# language and utilises the .NET frame-
work for extracting events from live systems, as well as processing them from a standardised stored Windows
XML Event Log (EVTX) format. The software was executed on a machine with an Intel 3.6 GHz i7 CPU
with 16GB of available RAM. Both code and datasets are made publicly available in the “Availability”
section.
The implemented software includes code to perform χ2 and Jenks analysis, as presented in previous
sections. Figure 4 provides an overview of the stages implemented in the software solutions. The first stage
is where an event log is parsed and loaded into memory. This is then followed by the second stage where
the internal representation is processed to extract the series of objects. This includes processing the event
log description to extract key object information, excluding denoting text. For example, in security events
the object information is often denoted by a descriptive phrase followed by the semi-colon (:). The use of a
semi-colon creates potential to programmatically locate and extract object information.
Following this, an iterative algorithm is performed whereby χ2 scores are calculates for each object and
event combination, and then combined into an average for each event. These χ2 scores for each event are
then ordered in increasing order. An instance where an object and event are independent have a score of 0,
and therefore greater χ2 scores indicate dependence.
The final process is to iteratively perform Jenks analysis, increasing the number of classes with each
iteration. The purpose is to autonomously identify the best classification and to identify whether class 0
–the one containing the lowest χ2 scores– contains a series of anomalies. The output from the software is a
set of irregularities from class 0.
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7. Experimental Analysis
In this section, the ability of the presented technique is examined and discussed in terms of its ability
to maintain good performance with increasing log sizes, as well as its ability correctly identify irregular log
entries of interest. This section includes the three following analysis sections:
• Scalability analysis where computation time is presented for event logs with an increasing number of
irregularities, as well as establishing at what point the number of irregular events results in them no
long being identifiable as irregular. I.e., convergence has been identified.
• Analysis on previously 20 live, unseen event logs. No ground truth knowledge is available for the event
logs and they are processed to identify potential irregularities. This section discusses the identified
irregularities and suggests why they contain information that is of security relevance.
• As identified in the following sections, a large number of the 20 event logs do not contain any identifiable
irregular event entries. The third section includes introducing synthetic irregular event entries into
each of the 20 event logs.
7.1. Scalability
The main concern regarding scalability of the technique is around at what point an event log entry, if
frequently reoccurring, is no longer identifiable (i.e., a state of convergence has been reached). To demon-
strate the suitability of χ2 analysis for identifying irregularities on an albeit trivial system, an example is
provided where an event log is constructed to contain synthetic irregular events. The events all report the
allocation of new file system permissions, involving 10 unique users across 10 unique directories. Therefore
the distribution of permissions is that each user will be allocated permissions on 10 directories. An irregular
permission is then added where a new user (herein referred to as the test user) is allocated permission on one
of the 10 directories. The number of irregular permissions is then increased until 10, and at this point the
user assigned irregular permissions should be consistent with the 10 regular allocations. The experimental
event logs are created using a simple Powershell script to create users, directories, and assign permissions.
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Figure 5: Required computation time for computing χ2
scores.
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Figure 6: Results from calculating the independence of
test user with an increasing number of associated permis-
sions. The graph shows the difference between χ2avg(e)
and the next most significant event entry. Therefore, the
higher the number the better.
Figure 5 illustrates the computation time required for each event log. The phrase ‘irregular’ events refers
to the number of deliberately assigned permissions that are used to simulate infrequent event entries. It is
noticeable in the figure that computation time is increasing as the number of irregular event entries increases.
Calculation of χ2 scores is linear and has a complexity of O(n), where n is the number of events. For example,
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an event log dataset with 10 users, 10 directories, and each user granted access to each directory, contains
a total of 850 event entries made up of 11,130 objects. It took thirty seconds on a 3.6 GHz i7 CPU with
16GB of available RAM to process the results. Note that the number of events is considerably higher than
100 (1 for each user on each directory) as other events are also recorded during the process. For example,
events also report on requesting the access control list from an object.
Figure 6 illustrates the results from this experiment. The graph shows the difference between χ2avg(e)
and the next most significant event entry. The x-axis in the graph represents the total number of irregular
event log entries. However, as the test user is not involved with any other event log entries (i.e., creating
user accounts), it can also be stated that these are the total number of irregular log entries for the test
users. This allows us to establish by what margin ej is independent from ej+1. From the graph it is evident
that the measure of independence is decreasing as the number of event entries involving the test user has
increases. The experiment was stopped at 10 event entries as the total number of event entries reached
1020. Even though the analysis is still suggesting the test user has the highest measure of independence, it
is no longer feasible to consider entries involving the test user as irregular. The reason that test user still
has a high measure of independence is because the remaining 416 log entries are distributed across 10 users
and directories. The results presented in Figure 6 also demonstrate the potential implication of incorrect
classification of regular event entries should an event occur less frequently than any of the others within
the system. For example, from Figure 6 it can be seen that an event is more likely to be classified as an
anomaly if it appears infrequently when compared to other event entries within the system. It can therefore
be deduced that an infrequent yet correct event log entry is likely to be incorrectly classified if there are not
enough event log entries containing the same objects.
7.2. Live System Analysis
In this section, experimental analysis is performed on the event logs acquired from 20 number of com-
puters. Each computer is operating in a live environment and the event logs have been acquired with owner
permission. Dataset 1-12 and 14-15 are acquired from machines with the Windows 7 operating system
(OS) and work in a multi-user environment. The machines are typically used by university students. The
students belong to either under- or post-graduate programs and have different access rights and restrictions.
Typically, post-graduate students have a higher level of permission to develop, configure, and install soft-
ware. The machines are mostly used for document writing, Internet surfing, and the development of software
applications. Datasets 13, 16-20 are taken from Windows 10 based machines. They have the similar kinds
of usage as of Windows 7 machines, but the frequency of different users is higher. These event logs data is
gathered from 5 different university laboratories.
7.2.1. Results
Table 2 describes the characteristic of each event log. The table demonstrates the number of events
within each dataset and the total number of objects. In addition, the table also presents the number of
unique event types and objects as the developed technique takes steps to minimise processing time and
memory consumption. From analysing the table, it is evident that this experimental analysis is based on
a diverse range of event logs, ranging from those with around 300 events containing more than 5k objects
to those with other 25k events with more than 280k objects. As expected, the processing time ranges
considerably from 2 to almost 1,200 seconds. Interestingly, it is not necessarily the event logs with a large
number of events and objects that are the most time consuming. For example, the largest dataset (19) with
26k events and 282k objects is processed in 454 seconds, whereas dataset 18 of less than half the size (8.8k
events, 1331k objects) takes almost twice as long to analyse 950 seconds. The reason behind this difference
is due to the number of Jenks iterations performed before arriving at the point of convergence, where it is
not advantageous to further divide the data into more classes. In this specific example, dataset 19 took 11
iterations, whereas 18 required 75. It is also worth noting that the number of unique objects for dataset
18 and 19 is 1.3k and 1.7k, respectively. Considering that the technique only processes unique objects for
efficiency, it can be seen that the technique scales well to datasets of increasing sizes. The dataset requiring
the longest amount of time is dataset 3, containing 11.9k events and 13.6k unique objects. This is the
highest combination seen in all 20 datasets and required 1.2k seconds to process.
11
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Dataset
Num-
ber
Number
of
events
Number
of ob-
jects
Number
of
unique
event
types
Number
of
unique
objects
CPU
time
(s)
Number
of
Classes
Number
of events
in class 0
Contains
Irregular
Events
1 7752 136384 29 10238 590 26 7247 No
2 8249 142617 29 9786 700 34 569 No
3 11953 212363 26 13602 1217 26 5002 No
4 7725 135976 28 10230 462 12 7546 No
5 7706 135739 28 9206 467 21 7182 No
6 7884 138820 28 10320 589 24 7326 No
7 8258 145702 28 10714 725 32 2508 No
8 9718 172028 29 12009 914 30 6091 No
9 10203 180791 28 12353 778 17 9834 No
10 7781 137032 28 11227 564 24 7249 No
11 9858 174517 29 12544 846 19 9488 No
12 9767 172953 27 11667 863 27 6222 No
13 13022 173704 28 7729 751 24 2142 No
14 293 5252 5 712 2 44 3 Yes
15 298 5342 5 712 4 111 1 Yes
16 568 7899 4 727 5 61 1 Yes
17 10948 163103 15 7068 464 11 5581 No
18 8817 113183 20 1321 958 74 72 No
19 26001 282581 16 1753 456 11 9020 No
20 386 6902 6 1131 9 161 1 Yes
Table 2: Example output from performing χ2 analysis
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Figure 7: Results from performing χ2 on the 20 event logs
Figure 7 presents the difference between χ2avg(ej) and χ
2
avg(ej+1). More specifically, the difference be-
tween the average score for the event entries identified in the first class – those identified as irregular – and
those in the next class with the closest average score. This is useful as it quantifies by how much they are
identified as irregular. The figure details that the majority of the 20 datasets have a difference score of less
than 400. Interestingly, 4, 17 and 19 all have difference scores of greater than 1,000. After cross-referencing
this information with the data provided in Table 2, it is clear that this is potentially due to the iterative
implementation of the Jenks natural breaks algorithm has converged with a low number of classes when
compared to all other datasets. More specifically, 17, 11 and 11 for dataset 4, 17 and 19, respectively.
Both Table 2 and Figure 7 demonstrate the characteristics and performance measures of the 20 datasets.
However, it is now necessary to consider the technique’s ability to identify irregular events of interest. As we
have no ground truth knowledge regarding contents of each dataset, determining overall accuracy without
performing an exhaustive audit of each dataset is challenging. Due to the restriction on human expert
knowledge, performing such a manual audit is not feasible. Furthermore, the technique is an unsupervised
approach and is expected to identify irregular events of potential interest without any prior expert guidance.
In the following section, empirical analysis is performed on the events identified within each dataset. The
analysis will interrogate each event individually to determine whether it is irregular and of potential interest.
From this analysis it is possible to calculate a measure of accuracy, i.e., the fraction of events identified to
be irregular that are both correctly and incorrectly identified.
After analysing the results from processing the 20 event logs, it is evident that no irregular events have
been identified within a significant portion of the event logs. More specifically, 15 of the event logs have
been found to not have any irregular events within them. A manual exploration has taken place to confirm
that this is that case, and in all cases this outcome has been identified as valid. In the remainder of this
section, a detailed analysis of the outcomes for event logs 14, 15, 16, and 20 are presented.
The irregular events identified within event logs 14 and 20 are all of event type 5447, which denotes that
a “Windows Filtering Platform filter” has been changed. Event logs 14 and 20 have 3 and 1 occurrences
identified as irregular. Interestingly, these events have been identified not because of the frequency, but
because the objects that are reported in the events occurring infrequently with this event ID. Events of
type 5447 occur 576 and 762 times in total for dataset 14 and 20, respectively. The 5447 events within
event logs 14 and 20 have χ2avg(e) of less than 3. In both event logs, the occurrence of objects such as
“TermServiceLOM”, “ALE Receive/Accept v6 Layer”, and “NT AUTHORITY\LOCAL SERVICE” are
identified as infrequent and rarely occurring with events of type 5447. It is therefore possible to establish
that these objects fail a test of dependence, and thus are classified as irregular.
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Event log 15 contains one event of type 4726 that denotes that a user account was deleted. This event
was identified as been irregular as although many other account deletion events are present within the log,
the one identified as irregular contains the use of a “TUser0”. In a similar fashion, “TUser0” was involved
in many other events in the event log, but is not linked to any other account deletion events. Although it
is not possible to state whether this event is of any significance to an investigator, it does demonstrate the
techniques ability to adequately identify irregular event entries. More specifically, although the technique
is good at finding poorly connected object and event types, it is not possible to state whether it contains
any significant security information. However, based on empirical observations performed in this paper, it
can be stated that the security events identified do contain information pertinent to increasing a system’s
security.
One irregularity has been identified in event log 16. This is event 4798 and reports that a user’s local
group membership was enumerated. This event is automatically generated by the system once a process
enumerates a user’s security-enables local groups. More specifically, the process is analysing the security
group associations of a user. In the first instance it would appear that this event is not out of the ordinary
as processes will frequently enumerate a user’s group associations during requesting permission to resources
and services. However, this particular event is irregular due to its associated objects. This event contains
the “Administrator” group which is not irregular; however, what is irregular is that it appears within the
same event as the workstation “CWG05-04”. This is the first time this combination occurs and hence it
being identified as irregular.
This empirical analysis has demonstrated that irregular event log entries can be detected that are irregular
in terms of their object relationship. This is significant as simply considering event frequency would not
identify these events. In the presented examples, all the identified event types are frequently occurring.
Although this analysis has only identified irregular events within four out of sixteen of the event logs, it is
still beneficial to be able to identify that there are no irregular events within the logs.
7.3. Live System and Synthetic Irregular Events
In the previous section, 20 event logs acquires from live systems have been analysed. A key finding
is that the technique has not identified any irregular events in 16 of the logs. Although, manual analysis
has taken place to ensure that this is correct, it is not fully known if any irregular security events have
been missed. More specifically, in the analysis, classes containing the lowest χ2avg(e) values are manually
inspected to determine if any irregular security events have been identified in classes of a low number (i.e.,
those greater than 0). However, a key limitation of this analysis is that irregular events may be present
in classes containing a higher χ2avg(e) score, and due to the time required to perform a full manual audit,
irregular security events may have gone undiscovered. For this reason, this section introduces analysis
whereby synthetic irregular security events are added and used as ‘ground-truth’ knowledge to determine
the techniques accuracy.
In performing this synthetic analysis, the following methodology is followed:
1. First, the previous 20 event logs are processed in turn to identify what security event types are present.
This involves matching against a known list of security event IDs 2. It is important to identify what
security events are available within the system, and to use them to create synthetic and irregular
event logs. Selecting an event type that does not exist within the log would yield poor results as the
technique is designed to identify irregularities in the relationship between objects and events, and not
the occurrence of a unique security event.
2. Identify the frequency of each security event type, and select the 10 most frequent. A maximum of
10 is used due to the findings in Figure 6, whereby after 10 irregular events the difference between
the average values of class 0 and 1 converge. The most frequent are chosen as we want to identify
the technique’s ability to identify irregular events log entries, where an irregular event is defined by
its unusual set of objects. In the instance where 10 different event types are not available, we use the
number available, providing the occurrence of the event type is greater than 10.
2A list of all security event IDs was identified at the following URL:https://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/
securitylog/encyclopedia/
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PC /
Dataset
Number
Number of
Irregulari-
ties
tp fp tn fn tpr fpr tnr fnr accuracy
1 7 7 0 7752 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
2 9 9 0 8249 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
3 6 2 2664 9289 4 0.33 0.22 0.78 0.67 0.56
4 6 6 0 7725 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
5 6 6 2706 5000 0 1.00 0.35 0.65 0.00 0.82
6 7 7 0 7884 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
7 6 6 0 8258 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
8 6 6 226 9492 0 1.00 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.99
9 6 6 0 10203 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
10 6 6 0 7781 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
11 6 5 0 9858 1 0.83 0.00 1.00 0.17 0.92
12 7 7 419 9348 0 1.00 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.98
13 10 2 1632 11390 8 0.20 0.13 0.87 0.80 0.54
14 1 1 288 5 0 1.00 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.51
15 1 1 293 5 0 1.00 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.51
16 1 1 0 586 1 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.75
17 6 2 0 10948 4 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67
18 10 10 77 8740 0 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.00 1.00
19 10 10 8 25993 0 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
20 1 1 132 254 0 1.00 0.34 0.66 0.00 0.83
Average 0.86 0.15 0.85 0.14 0.85
Table 3: Results from performing experimental analysis
3. Synthetic event entries are then inserted using a synthetic set of objects, which are unique to the
event’s occurrence in respect to the set of all objects related to events of this specific type. For the
purposes of this analysis, a test object is introduced and assigned to the synthetic event.
4. Perform analysis on each of the 20 event logs, using ground-truth knowledge of the synthetic irregular
events to identify: True Positive Rate (tpr): the fraction of irregular events correctly identified as being
irregular; False Positive Rate (fpr = 1 - tnr): the fraction of regular event logs incorrectly identified as
being irregular; True Negative Rate (tnr): the fraction of regular event logs entries correctly identified
as regular; False Negative Rate (fnr = 1- tpr): the fraction of irregular event log entries incorrectly
classified as regular; and finally, Accuracy is reported as the fraction of all samples correctly identified.
More specifically, Accuracy = tpr+tnrtpr+tnr+fpr+fnr
Table 3 presents the results from performing the analysis. As evident in the table, the number of
irregularities is in most cases (apart from dataset 13, 18, and 19) is less than 10. This indicates that that in
the majority of the event log datasets, there are fewer than 10 security event types. The lowest occurring
in dataset 20 whereby there is only 1 security event type identified.
It is evident in Table 3 that the tpr is high due to a large potion of irregularities being correctly identified.
Those datasets that have a poor tpr –specifically 3, 13, and 17 and all have a tpr below 0.40 – are those
identified to have a smaller difference in the measure of independence between class 0 and 1 (χ2avg(t1)
- χ2avg(t0)) in Figure 7. This inability to detect irregular events due to the numeric insignificant of their
χ2avg(e) score. More specifically, there is a small, and sometime no, difference between all the events identified
to be part of class 0 and subsequent classes (1, 2, etc.).
This above reason is why the technique sometimes has a high fpr. There are, however, also datasets
with high a fpr that have a good tpr. For example, dataset 14 and 15 have a tpr of 1 but have a high fpr
due to many regular events been incorrectly identified. This incorrect classification is due to the analysis
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technique not identifying any statistical difference between regular and irregular event log entries. From
cross referencing these results with those presented in Table 2, it is clear that datasets with a high fpr have
both a substantially lower number of event and unique event types.
The tnr and fnr are also good apart from those event logs of a small size or those that have poor tpr
and fpr values. The overall accuracy reports the fraction of events which are correctly identified (either
as correct or incorrect). The average accuracy over all datasets is 85%; however, it should be noted that
datesets significantly impacting the overall accuracy are those with few event entries and unique event types.
8. Conclusion
This paper presents a novel technique and its implementation in software for automatically identifying
irregular event logs entries, which could indicate suspicious and malicious activity in a system. Currently,
the implementation is done for Microsoft based operating systems using C# language and .NET platform.
The proposed solution requires the input in a structured manner to perform accurate analysis. Each event
log is modelled into an objects-based entity. Each entity contains a group of timestamp, event ID and set
of relevant objects such as account names, processes etc. In this paper, first the frequency of each unique
event log is determined and further arranged into different classes using Jenks natural breaks method. The
problem with this approach is that it requires expert knowledge and manual work to verify whether low
frequency events are irregular and of significance.
In order to produce a more sophisticated and useful solution, statistical analysis is performed using the
well-established χ2 test along with Jenks method to categorise the one-dimensional data to identify groups of
entries with low scored. The χ2 statistic has a natural value of zero, given the objects are fully independent.
Therefore, if the mean χ2 value of event log (determined by its objects) is closer to zero, it implies the event
log is relativity independent from others, and hence classed as irregular. The proposed solution is tested
by acquiring event logs from a multi-user network of machines in a university environment. The results
are promising as the solution was able to identify irregular event logs based on object relationship in a
reasonable amount of time. For example the largest event log processes with in excess of 210k event logs
requires over 1200 seconds. The proposed tool is beneficial as the manual process of identifying irregular
event requires expert knowledge, which might not be present or affordable. Further experimentation has
demonstrated the technique’s ability to identify synthetic irregularities with an average 85%. The produced
technique can provide both experts and non-experts alike with a technique capable of identifying potential
events of interest much more quickly than performing a manual audit.
9. Availability
All source code and event logs used in this paper are available at: bttp:\selene.hud.ac.uk\scomsp2\
event
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